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The Electoral College and the Federal Bias 
CARLETON w. STERLING 
University of Notre Dame 
Although most of the public believes that the President is elected 
in the nation's ballot boxes every four years according to democratic 
principles, the more sophisticated know that he is elected by a complex 
federal mechanism that only approximates a popular election. Usually 
the apparent popular vote favorite also wins an electoral college ma-
jority, and is thus elected President Actually, national popular vote 
tallies have no legal standing. They are unofficial tabulations calculated 
by the convention of combining the popular votes for each slate of 
electors pledged to a particular presidential ticket in the various states 
and (since 1964) the District of Columbia. 1 Nonpopular aspects of the 
system provide biases that may affect the selection of the President, 
particularly when leading candidates closely compete for the popular 
votes. Political analysts, however, are divided on the cumulative effects 
of these biases. 
Many liberal political scientists believe that the present system 
favors liberal urban and minority groups. These groups allegedly hold 
the balance of power in the largest states casting large blocs of electoral 
votes under the winner-take-all system that the states have adopted for 
appointing electors. 2 The southern states with relatively low voter turn-
outs are theoretically advantaged under the present system because 
states with equal populations control equal numbers of electors, whereas 
under direct election, electoral strength would be cast only by voters. 
On the other hand, the winner-take-all system penalized the South dur-
ing its period of one-party domination. The presidential ticket carrying 
the South won its electoral votes by overwhelming popular pluralities 
while the opposing ticket often accumulated more electoral votes with 
1 Sometimes members of the same electoral slate pledg ed to the same national 
ticket may not receive precisely the same number of popular votes. In those instances, 
the convention has been to attribute to a presidential ticket those votes cast for the 
greatest vote-getter pledged to the ticket. 
2 After the 1968 election, when there was much concern with reforming the 
electoral system, Maine adopted a district system for electing its electors apportioned 
for its representation based on population. Maine only has two districts and the 
move was apparently to dramatize discontent with the winner-take-all system. The 
district system was once popular, but was generally abandoned in favor of the 
winner-take-all general ticket system by 1832. The general ticket system has been 
the exclusive system employed in the states in the twentieth century. 
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the same popular strength by carrying states by more modest margins 
elsewhere. Other biases have convinced many observers that the small 
states are advantaged by the present system and, therefore, should resist 
attempts to introduce a direct popular election of the President. Although 
there are flaws in all claims of special advantages for particular groups 
under the electoral college system, this article will focus on the alleged 
electoral advantages for the small states. 
The most obvious bias favoring the small states is the two electora l 
votes apportioned each state for its equal representation in the Senate 
in addition to the votes apportioned for its proportional representation 
in the House. These two "extra" votes for each state do enhance the elec-
toral power of the small states as compared to a system basing apportion -
ment solely on population. A small state that is entitled to only one or 
two U. S. Representatives on the basis of its population has its electoral 
college representation at least doubled by the two votes based on repre-
sentation in the Senate. If the 50 states and the District of Columbia 
are considered as three blocs of equal numbers of large, intermediate, 
and small states, then the 17 small states 3 would have lost half their 
electoral strength in the last presidential election, if they had been 
apportioned votes precisely proportional to their populations. The 17 
intermediate states would have lost modestly, about five percent of their 
strength, while the 17 large states would have gained about ten percent 
under an apportionment precisely proportional to population. 4 
Superficially, the relative enlargement of small state electoral strength 
by the two "extra" votes per state would seem to indicate that the present 
system does significantly magnify the electoral power of the small states 
in presidential elections. 5 However, the present apportionment system 
makes the small states incapable of mobilizing an electoral majority 
except in combination with large states. When absolute vote strengths 
are compared under the present apportionment, the 17 small states have 
only 62 votes, the 17 intermedia te states 134, and the 17 large states 
3 The District of Columbia is treated as one of the smallest states for purposes 
of electoral college representation. 
4 These calculations were based on the 1960 census and the apportionment 
according to that census. The 1970 census and subsequent reapportionment do not 
alter the figures presented here. 
5 Electoral power has been defined as the ability of an electoral unit to affect 
electoral outcomes measured by the mathematical probability that its votes would 
be decisive to an electoral majority. Theoretically, this is different than a state's 
electoral vote strength. However, given the large number of possible winning coali-
tions of states under the present system, the electoral power of each state is almost 
precisely proportional to its electoral vote strength, See: Irwin Mann and L. S. 
Shl!J)ely, "The A Priori Voting Strength of the Electoral College," in Game Theory 
and Related Approaches to Social Behavior, ed. Martin Shubik (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1964) , pp. 151-164. 
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342.s As 270 electoral votes are necessary to elect a President, clearly 
the small and intermediate states are powerless unless allied with large 
states. In fact, under the present apportionment, eleven large states could 
control a majority of the electoral votes. 
A small state may contribute more electoral votes than its popula-
tion alone would warrant to coalitions favored by a popular plurality 
of its voters. In 1960 and 1968, when the major-party voters were almost 
evenly split nationally, Richard Nixon was able to carry a maiority of 
the states against Democratic coalitions with his greater popularity out-
side the most populous states. In 1968 Nixon carried 32 states with 302 
electoral votes, while Hubert Humphrey carried only 14 states (including 
the District of Columbia) and 191 electoral votes, and George Wallace 
carried five states and 45 electoral votes.7 Indeed, had Nixon won pre-
cisely 50 percent of the two-party votes in 1968, he still would have 
carried 32 states against 14 for Humphr ey. One can project the states 
that Nixon would have carried with precisely half the major-party votes 
nationally by assuming that a constant percentage of the major-party 
votes would have shifted in each state to produce an equal national 
division. This neutral assumption facilitates a demonstration of the effect 
of the distribution of popular support among the states independent of 
popular preference for a particular presidential ticket. Because Nixon 
carried all his states by relatively more than his national popular vote 
margin, no states and their electoral votes would shift to Humphrey. 
Thus, with the two major parties equally dividing the nation's popular 
votes, Nixon would still carry four of the nine states containing most of 
the nation's population and 28 of the rest of the states. Humphr ey would 
still carry five of the nine largest states and, only nine of the remaining 
states. Nixon's 18-state lead over Humphrey represented a 36-vote lead 
based on the states' two "extra'' votes, and Nixon built up his lead in 
state victories outside the states with the most population. Nixon was 
the popular vote favorite in the smaller states, carrying about 52.7 per-
cent of the major-party votes in these states, and would have carried a 
projected 52.3 percent with an equal division of the two-party votes. 
However, with an electoral lead of 111 votes over Humphrey, Nixon 
gained at least 75 additional electoral votes through biases in the system 
not attributable to the two "extra" votes for each state. This was prin-
cipally the result of the Republicans carrying their states by more modest 
margins than the Democrats carried their states with equal popular 
6 Under the previous apportionment the division was 63, 135, and 340 votes 
for the small, intermediate, and large states respectively. 
7 One elector chosen on a slate pledged to Nixon in North Carolina voted for 
Wallace, leaving Nixon with 301 votes in the electoral college. 
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support nationally. The Republican votes were so well distributed rela-
tive to the Democratic votes in 1968 that Nixon could have won an 
electoral majority with a projected 49.1 percent of the major-party votes. 
Assuming a constant percentage shift of major-party support to the 
Democratic ticket in each state, Humphrey would have needed 51.2 per-
cent of the major-party votes. Because this meant that Nixon could have 
beaten Humphrey while trailing him by more than one million popular 
votes, the projections cast doubt on the thesis that urban liberal and 
minority groups in the populous states are particularly advantaged by 
the present system in close elections. Humphrey's voter coalition was 
essentially liberal compared to Nixon's, with particular strength in the 
cities and among non-whites and non-Protestants. 8 
The case for a net advantage for small state voters is also dubious. 
Although trailing slightly in the national popular vote count in 1960, 
Nixon still carried a majority' of the states, winning 26 states against 23 
for Kennedy. 9 Nixon trailed two states to seven in the nine states contain-
ing a majority of the nation's population, but led in the rest of the 
nation with 24 states against 16 for Kennedy. Although carrying only 
48.9 percent of the two-party vote in the nine largest states, Nixon 
carried 51.2 percent of the votes elsewhere. Projecting for an equal divi-
sion of the two-party votes, only Hawaii with three electoral votes would 
shift to Nixon. Nixon's proiected 27 to 22 state lead gives him only 10 
electoral votes based on his ability to carry more of the votes apportioned 
to states, regardless of population, because of his disproportionate 
strength in the smaller states. Moreover, as Kennedy actually enjoyed 
an 84 electoral vote lead over Nixon, and Kennedy would still lead by 
a projected 78 votes with a precisely equal share of the popular votes, 
the cumulative bias of the electoral system worked against the favorite 
of most small states in 1960. Nixon would have needed a projected 50.3 
percent of the major-party votes to carry an electoral majority, assuming 
a constant percentage shift of major-party voters from Kennedy to Nixon 
in each state. Kennedy would have won a minimum electoral majority 
with ai projected 49.8 percent of the two-party votes. 
Comparing the results of the 1960 and 1968 elections under an equal 
division of the major-party votes, shows that Nixon's lead outside the 
largest states increased considerably from ten more state victories than 
8 According to the Survey Research Center data, the three-party 1968 presi-
dential contest gave Humphrey 94 percent of the black vote, 85 percent of the 
Jewish vote, and 54 percent of the Catholic vote. He carried 50 percent of the votes 
in the cities ( population over 50,000) and was more popular in the larger cities. 
9 Mississippi voters elected an unpledged slate that voted for Harry Byrd of 
Virginia. The rest of the states supported major-party tickets. The District of Colum-
bia possessed no electoral votes at the time of the 1960 election. 
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the Democrats in 1960 to 19 more in 1968. This increase occurred at the 
same time that two of the nine largest states swung from the Democratic 
to the Republican column of state victories. These simultaneous Republi-
can gains in state victories, with national popular support held constant, 
raises the suspicion that Nixon's 36 vote advantage gained through carry-
ing more of the "extra votes" in 1968 may not only be attributable to 
greater popularity in small states, but also to a favorable distribution of 
his support among these states for carrying state-wide majorities. 
The small increment in the electoral strength of the small states 
under the present system because of the non-popular aspects of appor-
tionment does not measure the influence of the small state voters. The 
casting of a state's electoral strength under the general ticket system is 
controlled by a state-wide majority vote, and a very sizeable minority 
in the state may be denied any influence on the casting of its electoral 
votes. Moreover, even though they seem generally to have a net prefer-
ence for Republicans, 10 the small states do not vote as a unified bloc, 
and thus any advantage for the majority of such states is partially offset 
by the minority. Consequently, the advantage to the small state voters 
as a group in influencing the electoral college is small and appears easily 
outweighed by other biases of the present electoral system. 
The preceding analysis attempted to illustrate the impact for small 
states and their voters of the present electoral apportionment and the 
winner-take-all system of controlling a state's electors. However, there 
is one aspect of the present constitutional system that may provide the 
representatives of the small states more influence in selecting the Presi-
dent than their small constituencies alone would warrant. The President 
is not necessarily chosen by the electoral college, in which most of the 
electors are from the large states. An absolute majority of all the presi-
dential electors apportioned to the states must support a candidate to 
elect him President. One party has always controlled a majority of the 
electoral votes since 1824, and as long as the two major parties control 
almost all of the electors, the electoral college is likely to elect the 
President. In the absence of an electoral maiority, however, the Consti-
tution requires that the state delegations in the House of Representatives 
elect the President from among the three leading candidates in the elec-
toral votes. As each state delegation, large or small, would cast one 
ballot, 26 states representing relatively few people could elect the Presi-
dent from among the three candidates nominated by the electoral col-
10 The Republicans usually carried most of the smaller third of the states in 
the 26 presidential elections after the Civil War. The Democrats with the support 
of the medium-sized states of the South usually carried most of the intermediate 
third of the states throughout this period. 
36 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
lege. In theory, the smallest 26 states, containing only about 15 percent 
of the nation's population, could out-vote the states representing the 
oveiwhelming majority of Americans. 
This small state bias was intended by the framers of the Constitu-
tion to allay fears that only candidates favored in the large states would 
muster large blocs of electoral votes. As national coalitions were not 
envisioned, it was presumed that the state-appointed electors would favor 
home-state figures. The Constitution originally provided that the electors 
would have to cast a second ballot for someone outside their home state. 
Yet, unless there was some obvious choice, it would be difficult for the 
electors voting in their separate state capitals to concentrate their second 
presidential ballots. In compensation, the contingent election would give 
the small state representatives an equal voice, with delegations from 
populous states, in selecting the President from among the leading 
choices of the electoral college. The original rationale for a contingent 
election, providing for state equality, evaporated almost immediately 
when national partisan coalitions united state majorities, irrespective 
of state size, and facilitated the election of the President without resort 
to the contingent election. Thus, there have been only two contingent 
elections. The first occurred in 1801 when the House delegations were 
obliged to choose between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr because the 
original electoral system was unable to distinguish between the partisan 
votes for President and Vice President. To insure that a national party 
coalition could control both the offices of President and Vice President 
without further embarrassment, the Twelfth Amendment was passed 
in 1803 to provide separate electoral college balloting for these two 
offices. 
The last contingent election occurred in 1825 after the dominant 
Democratic Party had failed to agree on a national nominee in 1824 
and four candidates with largely sectional bases of support divided the 
electoral votes. Henry Clay, the Speaker of the House, helped organize 
a coalition of state delegations behind John Q. Adams, who was elected 
President over Andrew Jackson, the electoral vote leader. Jackson par-
tisans, however, discredited the Adams administration with charges that 
it had been spawned by a corrupt deal between Adams and Clay that 
frustrated the will of the people. The legitimacy of any future adminis-
tration undoubtedly would also suffer if it depended on a contingent 
election. 
In 1968 there was much concern that the third-party coalition led 
by George Wallace might force a contingent election by winning a large 
bloc of electoral votes in the South. Wallace slates actually captured five 
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states, with 45 electoral votes, in the deep South. Unable to cany Texas 
or sweep the South: however, Wallace's support was tool small to deny 
both candidates electoral majorities, especially with Nixon's favorable 
distribution of support for carrying electoral votes. Nevertheless, the 
danger was real, and an electoral college deadlock could have precipitated 
a severe political crisis. In 1968 thei Democrats won control of a majority 
of the state delegations in the House of Representatives. Thus, Hubert 
Humphrey would have been elected President in a contingent election 
in 1969, if congressmen had voted strictly according to party affiliations. 
According to that premise, Humphrey would have won 26 states, Nixon 
19, and five state delegations would have divided evenly and cast no 
ballot. However, a numb er of Representatives elected pledged to vote 
for their constituents' favorites in the event of a contingent election. If 
all the pledges had been honored and there were no other defections 
from party regularity, Humphrey would have had the support of 24 
state delegations, Nixon 22, with four split. 11 According to this premise, 
no candidate would have had the absolute majority of state delegations 
needed for election. Such a deadlock in the contingent election un-
doubtedly would have produced an electoral crisis. Congressmen would 
have been placed under tremendous pressure, some of it not so savory, 
to break the deadlock. Even some of the best motivated congressmen 
might have been tom between voting for their party's nominee, their 
constituents' preference, their state's preference, or the leading candidate 
nationally. If any Southern Democrats had been willing to follow an 
attempt by Wallace to bargain away control of the presidency, the 
system would have been more thoroughly discredited. 
The small states, thus, would have had a theoretical advantage in a 
contingent election through the disproportionate weight of their repre-
sentatives, the single representative from Nevada being as decisive as a 
majority of the New York or California delegations. However, contingent 
elections are rare and the contingent votes would be cast by representa-
tives whose choice would be largely determined by partisan and other 
considerations, distinct from the interests of small states as a group. Small 
state voters, of course, would be divided between the national partisan 
coalitions, and would hardly feel benefited as a group by the equality 
of their state delegations with those of the populous states. The lack of 
public confidence in such an election would extend even to those groups 
presumably enjoying disproportional representation. 
Some eminent students of politics have held that abolishing the two 
electoral votes now apportioned each state regardless of population would 
11 Lawrence Longley and Alan G. Braun, The Politics of Electoral College 
Reform (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 17. 
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violate an important compromise between the large and small states at 
the Constitutional Convention of 1787. In the Senate debates over elec-
toral reform in 1956, Senator John F. Kennedy argued that the states 
joined the Union on the understanding that they would have the same 
number of electoral votes as the number of Senators and Representatives. 
Direct popular election, he suggested, would constitute a "breach of the 
agreement made with the states when they came into the Union." 12 
Interestingly, this "breach of contract" argument has not been applied 
to the bias of contingent election. One reason for the failure to argue 
for this aspect of the electoral system is that the national partisan coali-
tions have been able to avoid resort to contingent election since 1824. 
Another reason is that a contingent election, as provided by the Constitu-
tion, would constitute so treacherous a proceeding that no one could 
make a plausible case for it. 
Nevertheless, now that contingent election of the President has 
lain dormant since 1824, some defenders of the present system depict 
the present electoral apportionment as conforming to the principle of the 
federal system, which popular election would violate. However, although 
based on representation in both houses of Congress, the electoral college 
is not analogous to Congress in the way the states are represented. The 
Congress is a coordinate body, and the branch in which the small states 
share equality with the large states can block any act of the branch 
basel on proportional representation. The electoral college would be 
analogous to Congress voting as a single body. Although the small states 
would have somewhat more representation than their population alone 
would warrant, the small state congressmen would be overwhelmed by 
the large state congressmen if representatives were to align according 
to the size of ,their states. They invariably do not align this way, but that 
only makes the small state bias inconsequential to small states as a group. 
The philosophy that direct election would constitute a violation of 
a fundamental agreement of the Union of the states ignores the proba-
bility that many compromises necessary in 1787 would fail to win the 
acceptance of future generations. The drafters of the Constitution recog-
nized this and provided for an amending process. The Constitution does 
provide that no state can be deprived of its equal representation in the 
Senate without its consent; all other aspects of the nation's representa-
tive system are now open to amendment. Actually, it was the equal 
representation in the Senate that was seen as the crucial concession to 
the small states, and the electoral apportionment was originally seen 
12 Congressional Record, CII, Senate, March 20, 1956, p. 5150. 
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as so favorable to the large states as to require equality of the states 
voting in the contingent election. 
Although there is a slight bias favoring the small states in the 
electoral apportionment, it is easily overwhelmed by other biases in the 
system. Indeed, from the perspective of campaign strategists, the popu-
lous states will usually seem to require the most attention in a presi-
dential campaign despite the small state bias in apportionment. Of 
course, campaign managers would prefer appeals that would win support 
across the board and media that could' reach potential support through-
out the nation. Few candidates lose because of poor distribution of 
support, but many lose simply from insufficient popular strength, even 
with favorable distribution. Nevertheless, campaign strategists must 
sometimes make choices about where to concentrate scarce resources. A 
party coalition would gain more electoral votes by carrying several small 
states than by carrying one large state with the same population as the 
combined small states. On the other hand, if a national ticket has com-
petitive strength in all these states, then the chances of winning a popular 
plurality in the one large state might seem greater than winning popular 
pluralities simultaneously in the several small states. It might be rational, 
therefore, to give disproportionate attention to winning a plurality in one 
large state where a substantial bloc of votes is at stake, while expecting 
to win popular pluralities in at least some of the smaller states, for 
a net gain in electoral votes . If the large state voters were more closely 
divided in their preferences than the voters in the small states, then a 
presidential campaign would have even more incentive to seek the state's 
entire bloc of votes, which would seem within its grasp. 
Of course, a presidential ticket's appeals are limited by the nature 
of its core voter support. It may seek to pick up strength beyond that 
core, but not at the expense of alienating its basic constituency. Still, to 
the extent that managers of a presidential campaign must choose states 
in which to concentrate limited resources, they will probably select 
states where they have a reasonable chance of winning large blocs of 
electoral votes. The tendency to concentrate on the large states is rein-
forced by the great competitiveness of the major parties in most of the 
very large states. 
Under the present electoral system a presidential ticket must have 
considerable popular strength in the largest states because the eleven 
largest states alone contain an electoral majority. Therefore, a presi -
dential ticket must win at least some of these populous states to mobilize 
an electoral majority. While, theoretically, a ticket need carry none of 
the small or intermediate states, practically, a ticket must carry some of 
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the small or intermediate states because any serious opposition will 
almost certainly carry a number of the larger states. Given the present 
distribution of the major-party voter coalitions, the Democrats probably 
have to win most of the 17 large states to produce an electoral majority, 
while the Republicans must carry at least some of them for an electoral 
majority. At any rate, in a close election, a few large states with huge 
blocs of electoral votes are likely to be carried by relatively small popular 
vote pluralities. Thus, the large states are crucial in any closely contested 
election, and they might receive attention even disproportional to their 
large populations despite the theoretical small state bias of the present 
system of apportionment. None of this demonstrates any advantage to 
the large state voters as a group. On the other hand, there is no concrete 
evidence that the slight small state bias in electoral apportionment 
provides , any tangible advantage to small state voters. 
